Speaker: John Hillas
Affiliation: Department of Economics, UoA
Title: Backward Induction in Games with Imperfect Recall (with D. Kvasov)
Date: Wednesday, 13 October 2010
Time: 4:00 pm
Location: 301-242 [Science Centre, Symonds Street]
The standard solution concepts motivated by the idea of backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, extensive form perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium were explicitly defined only for games with perfect recall. In games with imperfect recall a literal application of the same definitions is clearly inappropriate. We give definitions that coincide with the standard definitions in games with perfect recall and define sensible solutions in games without perfect recall.
The basic idea is to look, at subsets of each player’s information sets, at the pure strategies that make that those subsets reachable and to define a system of beliefs as associating to that strategy and that subset a distribution over the other players’ strategies. We define the relevant solution concepts and show (conjecture) that the inclusions and the relation to proper equilibrium of the associated normal that were true for games with perfect recall remain true.
Very much work in progress.