Speaker: Addison Pan (University of Auckland)
Title: “A Note on The Pivotality Condition”
Date, Time and Venue: Wednesday, 23 May 2018, 14:00-15:00, 260-319 [Business School Building, Level 3]
Abstract: This note provides simple derivations of the equilibrium conditions for different voting games with incomplete information. In the standard voting game à la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), voters update their beliefs only based on the probability that they are pivotal. However, in voting games such as those in Ellis (2016) and Fabrizi and Pan (2017), given a closed and convex set of priors, the ambiguous averse voters select the prior from this set in a strategy-contingent manner. Therefore, it is shown in this paper that in ambiguous voting games the conditional probability of being pivotal alone is not sufficient to determine each voter’s best response.