Speaker: Arkadii Slinko (University of Auckland)
Paper to be presented: “Secret Sharing and Prisonner’s Dilemma” joint with Yvo Desmedt (University of Texas at Dallas)
Date, Time and Venue: Wednesday, 21 August 2019, 15:00-16:00, 260-5115 [Business School Building, Level 5]
Abstract: The study of Rational Secret Sharing initiated by Halpern and Teague (2004) regards the reconstruction of the secret in secret sharing as a game. It was shown that participants (parties) may refuse to reveal their shares and so the reconstruction may fail. Moreover, a refusal to reveal the share may be a dominant strategy of a party. In this paper we consider secret sharing as a sub-action or subgame of a larger action/game where the secret opens a possibility of consumption of a certain common good. We claim that utilities of participants will be dependent on the nature of this common good. In particular, Halpern and Teague (2014)’s scenario corresponds to a rivalrous and excludable common good. We consider the case when this common good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and many natural Nash equilibria. We list several applications of secret sharing to demonstrate our claim and give corresponding scenarios. In such circumstances the secret sharing scheme facilitates a power sharing agreement in the society. We also state that non-reconstruction may be beneficial for this society and give several examples.